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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-TREATMENT oF NoNDISTRIBUTABLE 
CAPITAL GAINS OF DoMESTic TRUST WITH FOREIGN BENEFICIARIES-Taxpayer, 
trustee of a domestic inter vivos trust, sued for a refund of United States 
income taxes paid on nondistributable capital gains of the trust. Trustee 
claimed that since all the beneficiaries of the trust were United Kingdom 
residents, this income was tax-exempt under the United States-United 
Kingdom tax convention provision that a United Kingdom resident "shall 
be exempt from United States tax on gains from the sale or exchange of 
capital assets."1 On appeal by the United States from a district court 
judgment for the trustee, held, reversed. Although distributable gains are 
allowed the exemption,2 long term capital gains realized by a domestic 
trust, and accumulated for later distribution, are considered income to the 
trust regardless of the beneficiaries' residence; the convention was not in-
tended to override United States law which treats a trust as a separate tax-
able entity.3 Maximov v. United States, 299 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 
371 U.S. 810 (1962). 
The most reasonable argument for the exemption of nondistributable 
capital gains sought in the principal case would seem to be that, since 
distributable gains are exempt4 under the convention's article XIV, there 
is no logical reason for taxing gains which are accumulated for later dis-
tribution. On the facts as presented in the principal case, interests in both 
distributable and accumulated gains are vested in the beneficiaries, and 
neither is taxable to them in the United Kingdom,5 though both would 
be taxable under United States law. Under the convention, as applied 
by the court, the only distinction between the two types of gain is in the 
lapse of time between receipt by the beneficiaries of distributed gains (when 
realized by the trust) and accumulated gains (upon termination of the 
trust)-a distinction which logically appears to be an artificial basis for 
radically different tax treatment. This reasoning, although arguably cor-
rect, does not compel a conclusion that the convention was to be applied 
on the basis of such apparent logic, or that a distinction for tax purposes 
between distributable and nondistributable capital gains was unintended. 
The primary interpretative inquiry, therefore, must be directed to the 
purpose and nature of the convention. In the principal case, the trustee 
argued that the purpose of the convention was to establish strict equality 
1 Convention With the United Kingdom Respecting Double Taxation and Taxes 
on Income and Protocol, April 16, 1945 and June 6, 1946, art. XIV, 60 Stat. 1384, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1546 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. Under article II [60 Stat. 1378 
(1946)], the term "United Kingdom" includes Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) 
and Northern Ireland. Since ratification, the convention has been extended, as allowed 
under article XXII(l) [60 Stat. 1387 (1946)], to cover a total of twenty British overseas 
territories. See 4 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1) 4279.035. 
2 Income currently distributable to beneficiaries is allowed the article XIV exemp-
tion. See T.D. 5569, 1947-2 CuM. BuLL. 100, § 7.519(c). 
3 See !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 64l(a)(l), 643(a)(3). 
4 See note 2 supra. 
5 See Jones v. Leeming, [1930) A.C. 415. 
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of tax treatment between residents of each country realizing income from 
sources in the other country. Since the United Kingdom imposed no 
capital gains tax, the trustee concluded that a strict equality approach 
required that the United States exempt this trust from a capital gains tax, 
the economic burden of which would fall on United Kingdom residents. 
The competing argument, accepted by the court, is based on the proposi-
tion that the differences in theory and terminology between the United 
States and United Kingdom tax systems make identical tax treatment 
impossible. Therefore, the convention should be literally interpreted and 
all taxes not explicitly removed or modified by the terms of the conven-
tion should remain in force under domestic tax laws. 6 
Despite the apparent logic of the trustee's contentions, the great diffi-
culty in evaluating a particular United States tax in terms of a correspond-
ing United Kingdom tax seems to point out the fallacy in his argument 
for equal tax treatment under the convention. This difficulty is particu-
larly apparent in the setting of capital gains treatment. The United States 
income tax laws allow preferential capital gains treatment to gain from 
the sale or exchange of a "capital asset," which is defined as all property 
of the taxpayer, whether or not related to a trade or business, but ex-
cluding property dealt with in a particular manner, such as property 
held primarily for sale to customers, business property subject to a de-
preciation allowance, and real property used in a trade or business.7 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom does not employ a separate rate 
structure for income realized in particular types of transactions. Depend-
ing on the nature of the property sold or exchanged (as opposed to the 
method of dealing with it), income is considered either fully taxable or 
is entirely disregarded for income tax purposes.8 Consequently, the United 
6 The literal interpretation of the convention applied by the court is as follows: 
article XIV exempts "a resident of the United Kingdom ..• " (emphasis added); article 
II(l)(g) defines "resident" as "any person ••• resident in the United Kingdom •.• " 
(emphasis added); the convention does not define "person," but article 11(3) states that 
"in the application of the provisions of the present Convention by one of the Con-
tracting Parties any term not otherwise defined shall, unless the context otherwise re-
quires, have the meaning which it has under the laws of that Contracting Party relating 
to the taxes which are the subject of the present Convention"; under United States law 
[INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 770l(a)(l)], "trust" is included within the meaning of "per-
son"; substituting "trust" for "resident" in article XIV, then, the exemption cannot 
apply because the trust is a resident of the United States. Convention, arts. XIV, II(l)(g), 
(3), 60 Stat. 1384, 1378, 1379 (1946). As to the trust being a United States resident, see 
Bence v. United States, 85 Ct. Cl. 701, 18 F. Supp. 848 (1937), and Estate of Cooper, 9 
B.T.A. 21 (1927). See also PHILLIPS, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ALIENS AND 
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS 166 (1952). 
7 INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 1221. Depreciable property and real property used in 
a trade or business are actually given more favorable treatment than a capital asset. 
Under INT. R.Ev. CoDE OF 1954, § 1231, income from a sale or exchange of these proper-
ties is taxable at capital gains rates, while losses are fully deductible from gross income. 
8 This nonrecognition of the capital asset, as such, encompasses several features dis-
tinctly unfavorable from the American point of view: no deduction is allowed for losses 
incurred in property sold or exchanged, and natural resource depletion allowances and 
annual property or machinery depreciation allowances (until actual replacement) are 
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Kingdom, using a completely different theory of classification, taxes at 
ordinary income rates many gains which would receive the more favorable 
capital gains treatment in the United States. Conversely, the United States 
imposes a capital gains tax on some transactions which would be subjected 
to no income tax whatever in the United Kingdom.9 Considering the im-
pact of United Kingdom income tax laws on some transactions which 
would receive capital gains treatment in the United States, and the addi-
tional burden of a gross receipts stamp tax on securities transactions in 
the United Kingdom, it has been stated that neither tax system is more 
favorable than the other in regard to overall capital gains treatment.10 
Apart from such a generalization, it seems clear that the dissimilar ap-
proaches in tax structure make a comparative study necessarily unreliable 
as a foundation for any logical inferences. 
The foregoing comparison suggests the unsoundness of the trustee's 
contention that the United Kingdom does not tax capital gains; more im-
portantly, it indicates that the convention's article XIV exemption (under 
which the trustee claims) was not given by the United States simply to 
match a pre-existent United Kingdom exemption.11 It would appear that 
the contracting parties did not attempt a point-by-point alignment of the 
two tax systems. Emphasis was placed on relief from elements in both 
systems which singly, or in combination, appeared most burdensome to 
international trade. As the systems themselves differed, likewise the un-
favorable elements requiring modification were not the same in each coun-
try. The convention sought to balance these elements through a series of 
reciprocal compromises. Realization that the convention's promises were 
bargained for in this manner, as opposed to "across the board" tax equal-
ization, leads to a realistic evaluation of the convention's purposes. Abo-
lition of double taxation was, without question, its primary aim. Although 
not allowed. See MAGILL, PARKER &: KING, A SUMMARY OF THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 20 
(1935). 
9 Ibid. A typical example of untaxed gains would be the individual trader's income 
from sale or exchange of securities having no connection with his trade or business. 
The United Kingdom test is known as the "adventure-in-trade" concept. Where a certain 
type of property is neither capable of an income yield or enjoyment to its owner, its 
sale or exchange results in ordinary income or loss. See Income Tax Act of 1952, ch. 10, 
§§ 122, 123 (schedule D, case I), 526, in 31 HALSBURY's STATUTES 112, 116, 489 (2d ed. 1952). 
See also Jones v. Leeming, (1930] A.C. 415; MAGILL, PARKER 8e KING, op. cit. supra note 8, 
at 20(g), and Brudno &: Hollman, The Taxation of Capital Gains in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, 1958 BRIT. TAX REv. 26, 40-41. In the setting of securities, 
however, it should be noted that the United Kingdom ad valorem stamp tax renders 
this tax advantage to the individual trader somewhat illusory. This 2% ad valorem 
tax is equivalent to the United States tax on a long-term capital gain of 9% of cost. 
Gains above this level would be progressively taxed in the United States up to 25%. 
Brudno &: Hollman, supra at 43-44. 
10 Brudno &: Hollman, supra note 9, at 43-44. 
11 See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Convention Between the United 
States, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Respecting Income and Estate Tax of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 56, 62 (1945) [hereinafter 
cited as 1945 Hearings], regarding Convention, art. XX, 60 Stat. 1389 (1945). 
1963] RECENT DECISIONS 1005 
"equality" was mentioned in the Senate hearings on this treaty, it does 
not appear to have been used in the context of specific tax alignment.12 
The legislative history provides abundant evidence that the convention 
negotiations were characterized by tightly worded concession and compro-
mise-and that its provisions were to be literally applied.13 This evidence 
of closely circumscribed bilateral negotiation militates for a strict appli-
cation by the courts; the courts should recognize that the convention does 
not-nor was it intended to-cover every transaction having a source of 
income in one country and a recipient of that income in the other.14 
Assuming that the United Kingdom does tax capital gains, and that 
the convention's purpose was not to achieve a strict equality of tax treat-
ment, the question remains whether nondistributable capital gains of the 
trust can be brought within the article XIV exemption. On facts identical 
to those in the principal case, the Ninth Circuit held, in American Trust 
Co. v. Smyth,16 that such gains are tax-exempt. Since the "economic bur-
den" of the ta.x fell on United Kingdom residents,16 the exemption was 
held to apply regardless of the United States concept of trust entities. The 
word "exempt" in article XIV, said the court, should be construed to mean 
"release from economic burden." However, such a construction appears 
to contradict the specific nature of the convention's terms. It is construc-
tion based on the same premises that was argued by the trustee in the prin-
cipal case, viz., strict equality of tax treatment and the absence of a United 
Kingdom capital gains tax. If these ostensibly false premises are ignored, 
and if the intent to limit the coverage of the convention is recognized, it 
would seem more appropriate to apply domestic law provisions as dictated 
by article II(3) of the treaty. "Economic burden," as a test, received no 
12 "Equality" is mentioned in the Senate hearings many times, but is used in only 
two contexts in the convention. In article XXI it is required that nationals of one 
country living in the other be taxed equally with the other country's citizens. The 
other category concerns transactions which were previously subject to double taxation; 
the convention permits each country to share revenues equally by reducing propor-
tionately the specific tax each applies-the aim being to tax the parties involved but 
once. These types of equality have nothing to do with the tax imposed in the principal 
case, for no double taxation problem is present. See 1945 Hearings 2, 3, 24, 61. 
13 Id. at 2. 
14 The definition of "resident" in the Convention, art. II(l)(g}, 60 Stat. 1378 (1946) 
["any person ••• who is resident in the United Kingdom for purposes of United Kingdom 
tax and not resident in the United States for purposes of United States tax'1, creates 
an ambiguity in many situations because a person may be considered a "resident" under 
the laws of both countries, and therefore not entitled to convention relief based on 
residence. Under article II(3), which expressly reserves the definition of terms not de-
fined in the convention to each country's laws, it appears not only that the convention 
failed to cover many transactions, but that it directed the manner by which these 
omissions would be handled-namely, by resort to domestic law. See note 5 supra. See 
also Alexander, The Income Tax Convention with the United Kingdom, 2 TAX L. REv. 
295, 297 (1947); 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1163 (1958). 
1G 247 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1957), reversing 141 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Cal. 1956). 
16 The court reasoned that since the tax would diminish the distributive shares that 
the beneficiaries would take upon termination of the trust, these beneficiaries were 
"economically burdened" by the tax. Id. at 153. 
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mention in the convention itself. It can hardly be implied, considering 
the many transactions which the convention does not cover and the many 
instances where taxation at the source of income was retained.17 
Despite apparent inequities, it is not the role of the courts to extend 
the convention beyond its literal terms. Only the negotiating arm of the 
contracting parties can formulate, in a comprehensive and consistent man-
ner, the intent of the convention. Moreover, the courts of England con-
sider the convention as only an addition to their national tax laws.18 These 
laws are applied in a strict, literal manner. English courts do not search 
for equity in taxation, believing that any modification or extension should 
originate in the legislative body which initially fashioned the law.19 Amer-
ican courts should adopt a similar practice in regard to the tax convention, 
not only as a means of achieving consistency with the strict application of 
the English courts, but, more importantly, as a recognition of the bargain-
ing processes out of which the convention agreement evolved. If the tax-
ation of nondistributable capital gains is deemed inequitable by the nego-
tiating parties, it would seem most appropriate to resolve the problem 
through the same method of concession and compromise which character-
ized the convention's original negotiations. The value of the holding in 
the principal case is that it points to a need for some means of periodic, 
bilateral revision of the convention. This would provide a proper remedy 
for conflicts which inevitably arise. Other tax conventions entered into 
by the United States have expressly provided for settlement of future con-
troversies through mutual agreement.20 Such a procedure, if incorporated 
into the United States-United Kingdom convention, either by amendment 
or by necessary implication, would answer the need for implementation 
by proper representatives of each of the contracting countries.21 
William C. Brashares 
17 The "economic burden" test is not mentioned in the 1945 Hearings either. It 
would appear that this test is solely attributable to the Ninth Circuit. 
18 See KOCH, THE DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 19-20 (1947). 
10 Id. at 21. 
20 See PHILLll'S, op. cit. supra note 6, at 309-10. 
21 If any bilateral modification of article XIV is forthcoming, it seems probable that 
greater restriction or even elimination of this exemption will be sought, as opposed 
to extension of its coverage. This contention draws support from the fact that in sub• 
sequent tax conventions entered into by the United States, the capital gains e.xemption 
has not been given. This exemption has proved to be an objectionable feature of the 
convention from the American viewpoint, and some writers feel it has created a "tax 
discrimination" in favor of United Kingdom residents. It has been further suggested 
that the essential reason for granting the exemption to nonresident aliens was the great 
difficulty in tracing the income of these persons, and collecting the ta.x; the increased 
exchange of tax information between countries has removed this difficulty. Sec Kanter, 
The United States Income Tax Treaty Program, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 69, 80-81 (1954). See 
also EHRENZWEIG & KocH, INCOME TAX TREATIES 1f 211, at 206 (1949). 
